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Sample average approximation 
a b s t r a c t 
We develop a method for finding approximate solutions to the continuous agent type principal-agent 
problem when analytical methods are not available. The solution is calculated by solving a discrete agent 
type version of the problem using sample average approximation and bootstrapping. We show how a so- 
lution to the approximate problem can be used to derive a lower bound and expected upper bound for 
the optimal objective function, and evaluate the error associated with the approximation. Numerical ex- 
amples illustrate convergence in the approximate solution to the true solution as the number of samples 
increases. This works yields a method for obtaining some tractability in continuous type principal-agent 
problems where solutions were previously unavailable. 
Published by Elsevier B.V. 
1. Introduction 
In the principal-agent problem, the principal optimizes the 
terms of an exchange with an agent who may have some pri- 
vate characteristic θ that is unknown to the principal. For exam- 
ple, the agent may have private demand θ for a product produced 
by the principal. While the exact value of θ may be unknown to 
the principal, both parties know the distribution of θ across dif- 
ferent agents. The principal seeks to maximize her expected profit 
given uncertainty in θ by offering the agent quantity q units of the 
product at total price t . 
This paper studies the principal-agent problem when the distri- 
bution of θ is continuous over a bounded range [ θ , θ ] with den- 
sity f ( θ ). We refer to this setting as the “continuous problem” and 
the setting where θ is a discrete random variable as the “discrete 
problem.” In the continuous problem, the principal offers the agent 
contract functions q ( θ ) and t ( θ ), so the agent chooses the quantity 
and price option depending on his private demand θ . In the dis- 
crete problem, the principal offers an option ( q m , t m ) for each pos- 
sible realization of the random variable θm , m = 1 , . . . , M according 
to the revelation principle. 
Many principal-agent results rely on the ability to derive ana- 
lytical solutions for the contract options. This paper explores the 
case where such analytical solutions are intractable either be- 
cause the formulation is too complex, or the space of possible 
values for θ is too large. For the continuous problem, the solu- 
tion can be found analytically for some specific functions f ( θ ). See, 
E-mail address: dsingham@nps.edu 
Laffont and Martimort (2009) for the foundations behind the con- 
tinuous problem, and Singham and Cai (2017) for a specific solu- 
tion example. Performing optimization over a function space for 
q ( θ ) and t ( θ ) is generally a difficult problem. This paper provides a 
method for bounding the optimal profit and finding solution esti- 
mates for the continuous problem. This method can be used when 
the density f ( θ ) is too complex to yield analytical solutions, or 
when f ( θ ) may not be available but data samples of θ are present 
to estimate the distribution. 
We refer to the continuous problem formulation as ", and its 
optimal objective value as "∗. We approximate the continuous 
problem using an empirical distribution with M discrete samples 
from f ( θ ) when M is very large. We call this discrete formulation 
"M and its optimal objective value "∗M . "M can be solved nu- 
merically, but for arbitrarily large M becomes computationally in- 
tractable due to the large number of decision variables and con- 
straints. We show how a sample average approximation (SAA) to 
"M , based on a smaller sample size N bootstrapped from the M 
samples, yields an upper bound in expectation on "∗M . Call this 
SAA problem ˜ "N and its optimal objective value ˜ "∗N . The solu- 
tion to ˜ "N can be interpolated to provide a feasible solution which 
yields a lower bound to the continuous problem optimal objective 
"∗. Without needing to solve "M , we show how a series of smaller 
˜ "N problems can be used to bound "∗M and closely approximate 
the continuous objective profit "∗. 
As advanced numerical computing methods become more pop- 
ular, the number and type of contracting problems that can be 
solved has increased drastically. Many recent computing meth- 
ods can be used to solve contracting problems numerically, and 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2018.12.032 
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we present relevant examples where numerical optimization is 
used to solve pricing problems that are traditionally solved an- 
alytically. Bertsimas and Thiele (2005) show how historical data 
can be used to formulate linear programs to solve newsvendor 
formulations. Ehtamo, Berg, and Kitti (2010) use an interative on- 
line method to solve a nonlinear pricing scheme in a monopo- 
listic setting with two buyers. Of particular interest is the work 
by Cecchini, Ecker, Kupferschmid, and Leitch (2013) which formu- 
lates and solves bilevel nonlinear programs to solve principal-agent 
problems numerically. The bilevel structure is apparent from the 
principal’s problem incorporating the agent’s optimization over his 
set of possible actions. The authors motivate the work by citing the 
limitations of the assumptions of the traditional principal-agent 
model, quoting Lambert (2006) who argues that relying on closed- 
form results limit the type and complexity of models that can be 
solved. Dempe (1995) originally suggested modeling the principal- 
agent problem as a bilevel program, and Cecchini et al. (2013) con- 
struct a version of the ellipsoid method for obtaining numerical so- 
lutions. Traditionally, the difficulties with solving bilevel programs 
are managed using a first-order approach which allows for replac- 
ing the inner agent optimization using assumptions on the prob- 
ability distribution of possible outcomes. While we adopt these 
standard assumptions here, these assumptions can be relaxed and 
a polynomial optimization approach used to find solutions in a 
moral hazard setting ( Renner & Schmedders, 2015 ). 
Most recently, there have been attempts to use numerical meth- 
ods to expand the types of agent distributions that can be solved 
in principal-agent problems. In particular, the size and structure of 
the discrete agent-type space could be expanded to allow for more 
complex heterogeneous agent settings. Cai and Singham (2018) de- 
veloped a nonlinear programming formulation to solve principal- 
agent problems when agents were subject to one of multiple dis- 
crete demand distributions. The principal faces the adverse selec- 
tion problem with regards to the possible demand distribution 
and both the principal and the agent face stochastic uncertainty 
within the distribution. Singham, Cai, and Fügenschuh (2019) ex- 
pands the types of contracts solved to include nonparticipation op- 
tions and aggregation across discrete agent types, meaning a large 
agent space could be reduced to allow for feasible implementation 
of contracts through shutdown or pooling options. Finally, Singham 
and Cai (2017) initially present the idea of using sample average 
approximation for principal-agent models with continuous demand 
distributions through a single numerical example. This present pa- 
per provides mathematical justification for this idea, and shows 
concretely how sample average approximation can be used to form 
a discrete problem that closely approximates the continuous prob- 
lem. Thus, results of the discrete problem can be leveraged to solve 
and derive bounds for the continuous problem using sample aver- 
age approximation, which is often used in stochastic optimization. 
Straightforward sample average approximation methods cannot 
be directly applied to the continuous problem " in the usual way 
because the solution space of the discrete approximation "M is 
fundamentally different from that of the continuous problem. The 
solution to " lies in a continuous function space, while any dis- 
crete problem has a finite-sized solution space which depends on 
the sampled values used. As N and M increase, the number of 
decision variables and constraints increases in the principal-agent 
problem, and so the feasible space also changes and is different 
from that of ". We construct "M as a way of compiling all dis- 
crete problems on the same space, allowing us to invoke known 
SAA convergence properties. The main result is that we can use an 
easily solvable discrete problem to obtain useful information about 
an intractable continuous problem. 
Section 2 details the formulations for the continuous and dis- 
crete problems. Section 3 presents the approximation problem and 
bounds. Section 4 presents numerical examples that demonstrate 
convergence of the optimal objective value as the number of boot- 
strap samples increases. Section 5 concludes. 
2. Formulation 
Maskin and Riley (1984) establish the conditions for adverse se- 
lection to be studied in the principal-agent setting, and show the 
nature of nonlinear pricing schemes for the principal using quan- 
tity discounts. Burnetas, Gilbert, and Smith (2007) study asymmet- 
ric information between a supplier and a retailer where there is 
uncertainty in the demand distribution and quantity discounts can 
be used to improve the supplier’s profits. Babich, Li, Ritchken, and 
Wang (2012) study contracting options with buyback between a 
supplier and a retailer where the retailer has private knowledge 
of the demand for the product, which can follow a discrete or 
continuous distribution, while the decision to switch suppliers is 
modeled in Löffler, Pfeiffer, and Schneider (2012) . Our formulation 
models a similar setting and focuses on the effect of agent demand 
uncertainty in the adverse selection problem without considering a 
moral hazard in terms of agent effort, though we note the principal 
can can balance investing in monitoring both demand and effort to 
improve profits ( Kung & Chen, 2012 ). Numerous other papers ex- 
plore the effects of information asymmetry between two parties 
on contracts and pricing, see Chen, Lai, and Xiao (2016) , Kim and 
Netessine (2013) , Hezarkhani (2016) , Tran and Desiraju (2017) . 
First, we describe the continuous problem and the standard 
assumptions made. See Appendix 3.1 of Laffont and Martimort 
(2009) for a complete reference on continuous principal-agent 
problems. Let θ be a bounded continuous random variable for the 
demand of the agent on [ θ , θ ] with bounded density f ( θ ). The prin- 
cipal faces a nonnegative, differentiable, increasing cost function 
s ( q ) for producing q units of the product. The agent has a value 
function v (q, θ ) for receiving q units of the product when his de- 
mand is θ . Standard assumptions include v (q, θ ) is nonnegative, 
twice-differentiable and concave in q , and increasing in q and θ . 
Additionally, we assume v (0 , θ ) = 0 , and the single-crossing prop- 
erty holds, where the derivative of v (q, θ ) with respect to q is in- 
creasing in θ . To ensure good behavior of our sampling approx- 
imation, we also assume that the functions v (q, θ ) and s ( q ) are 
bounded over the space of q, θ ∈ [0 , θ ] . 
The principal’s objective is to offer the agent contract functions 
( q ( θ ), t ( θ )), which specify a quantity q ( θ ) to be delivered at to- 
tal price t ( θ ) for each given demand θ . This contract maximizes 
her expected profit E[ t(θ ) − s (q (θ ))] with respect to the random 
variable θ . Let the information rent (excess utility to the agent) be 
defined as #(θ ) ≡ v (q (θ ) , θ ) − t(θ ) . We adopt the convention to 
rewrite the decision variables for the principal using ( q ( θ ), #( θ )) 
instead of ( q ( θ ), t ( θ )). Then, the principal’s problem for a continu- 
ous demand distribution is 
"∗ = max 
{ q (θ ) , #(θ ) } θ∈ [ θ , θ ] 
θ∫ 
θ
[ v (q (θ ) , θ ) − #(θ ) − s (q (θ )) ] f (θ ) dθ (2.1) 
subject to #( θ ) = 0 (IR θ ) 
#(θ ) ≥ #(θ ′ ) + v (q (θ ′ ) , θ ) − v (q (θ ′ ) , θ ′ ) 
θ , θ ′ ∈ [ θ , θ ] , θ ′ ≤ θ (IC θθ ′ ) 
q (θ ) ≥ q (θ ′ ) θ , θ ′ ∈ [ θ , θ ] , θ ′ ≤ θ (MON θθ ′ ) . 
We call the optimal profit value to the continuous demand 
problem "∗, and refer to this formulation as ". The optimal profit 
is a probability-weighted integral over the possible demand values, 
where the profit to the principal t(θ ) − s (q (θ )) is rewritten using 
the utility function v (q (θ ) , θ ) and information rent #( θ ). The op- 
timization occurs over the space of almost everywhere (a.e.) differ- 
entiable functions q ( θ ) and #( θ ) on the domain [ θ , θ ] . 
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It is known that the principal can restrict herself to contracts 
that are incentive feasible , which refers to two types of constraints 
needed to ensure optimality given asymmetric information. First, 
individual rationality constraints ensure the agents achieve nonneg- 
ative utility from participating, i.e., #( θ ) ≥ 0. The IR θ constraint en- 
sures individual rationality is met for the smallest demand agent θ
(the information rent will always be zero for this agent), and IC θθ ′ 
ensures information rent is nonnegative for other values of θ . Sec- 
ond, the incentive compatibility constraints IC θθ ′ ensure the agent of 
type θ prefers the contract designed for him more than those de- 
signed for other types θ ′ ≤ θ , i.e., v (q (θ ) , θ ) − t(θ ) ≥ v (q (θ ′ ) , θ ) −
t(θ ′ ) . Finally, it can be shown that q ( θ ) should be increasing ac- 
cording to a monotonicity constraint MON θθ ′ because of the single- 
crossing property, and this combined with the IC θθ ′ constraint im- 
plies that a local incentive compatibility check implies global in- 
centive compatibility. 
We note that the objective function in (2.1) is an expectation. 
Sample average approximation (SAA) is a method that can be used 
to solve optimization problems where the objective function is 
expressed as an expectation (see Kim, Pasupathy, and Henderson 
(2015) for an overview). Rather than evaluating the expectation ex- 
plicitly, samples of the underlying random variables are collected 
and a sample average function is used to estimate the expectation. 
The optimization is then performed over this sample average func- 
tion. Under certain conditions, the optimal value of the SAA prob- 
lem converges to that of the original problem as the number of 
samples increases. We show how SAA can be used to estimate so- 
lutions to " next. 
Suppose problem " does not yield an analytical solution, but 
M samples drawn from f ( θ ) are available, either from a simulator 
or through observations of real demand. Without loss of general- 
ity, assume samples θ1 , . . . , θM are arranged in increasing order. In 
this case, we formulate the discrete problem with these M samples 
using a sample average objective: 
"∗M = max { q m , #m } m =1 , ... ,M 1 M 
M ∑ 
m =1 [ v (q m , θm ) − #m − s (q m ) ] (2.2) 
subject to #1 = 0 (IR 1 ) 
#m ≥ #m −1 + v (q m −1 , θm ) − v (q m −1 , θm −1 ) 
m ∈ 2 , ..., M (IC m,m −1 ) 
q m ≥ q m −1 m ∈ 2 , ..., M (MON m,m −1 ) . 
Each sample θm , m = 1 , . . . , M, has empirical weight 1/ M . The 
constraint set is formed from these sampled θm values. The size of 
the decision variable space is now finite (q m , #m , m = 1 , . . . , M) , 
and needs to be no larger than the space of possible demand val- 
ues according to the revelation principle. We call the discrete for- 
mulation (2.2) "M and its optimal profit solution "∗M . The discrete 
problem is often solvable using a nonlinear or mixed-integer non- 
linear solver, for example, when v (q m , θm ) − #m − s (q m ) is con- 
cave. In Cai and Singham (2018) , a more complex version of this 
formulation is solved with multiple possible discrete demand dis- 
tributions. 
While taking a large sample M and solving "M may yield a 
promising approximation to ", there are some technical challenges 
to showing directly that the optimal solution of the sample av- 
erage problem converges to that of the continuous problem. Un- 
like in standard sample average approximation methods, the deci- 
sion variable space increases as M increases. The number and exact 
form of the constraints also increases and changes with increasing 
M . Finally, the discrete problem solution yields a sequence of con- 
tract points ( q m , #m ), and this is not a solution to the continuous 
problem. The next section presents an approximation method for 
addressing these challenges. 
3. Approximate problem formulation 
3.1. Large M -problem and bootstrap 
Recalling the assumptions on boundedness for the terms in the 
objective functions of " and "M , we note the objective function of 
"M is a Monte Carlo approximation of the integral objective func- 
tion in ". The error, for a fixed q ( θ ), #( θ ), between the objective 




m =1 v (q (θm ) , θm ) − #(θm ) − s (q (θm )) (3.1) 
is O(1 / √ M ) . The objective profit function (3.1) converges uni- 
formly to the objective function in " because of a.e. differentiabil- 
ity and boundedness of the included terms. Establishing concretely 
the convergence of the optimal objective function value "∗M to the 
optimal value of " is outside the scope of this paper and relies 
on functional law of large numbers results, but we know that a 
Monte Carlo approximation for " using "M for a given solution 
q ( θ ), #( θ ) has error O(1 / √ M ) . We fix a large sample size M for 
which we believe the error in the continuous objective function 
using a discrete approximation for the distribution is sufficiently 
small. 
While M may be large enough to provide a close approximation 
to ", the discrete problem may not be computable directly if there 
are too many samples. The numerical results at the end of the pa- 
per will give an idea of how large the sample size can be while still 
having reasonable run times. It is usually much easier to generate 
the M samples than to solve the corresponding optimization prob- 
lem "M . We next derive bounds for "M using a bootstrap formu- 
lation. Take N empirical samples ˜ θ1 , . . . , ˜ θN with replacement from 
the M samples to solve problem ˜ "N in (3.2) , Again, assume that 
the samples ˜ θ1 , . . . , ˜ θN are sorted in increasing order. We assume 
N < M and ˜ "N is solvable numerically. The bootstrap formulation 
˜ "N with optimal value ˜ "∗N is 




v ( ̃  qn , ˜ θn ) − ˜ #n − s ( ̃  qn ) ] (3.2) 
subject to ˜ #1 = 0 (IR 1 ) 
˜ #n ≥ ˜ #n −1 + v ( ̃  qn −1 , ˜ θn ) − v ( ̃  qn −1 , ˜ θn −1 ) 
∀ n = 2 , ..., N (IC n,n −1 ) 
˜ qn ≥ ˜ qn −1 ∀ n = 2 , ..., N (MON n,n −1 ) . 
The decision variables ˜ qn , ˜ #n correspond to the bootstrap sam- 
ples ˜ θn . We next show how solving ˜ "N yields bounds on "∗ and 
"∗M . 
3.2. Lower bound for "∗
A feasible lower bound for "∗ can be constructed using a solu- 
tion to ˜ "N . This lower bound solution, ( ̂  q(θ ) , ˆ #(θ )) , can be con- 
structed by using the points of the discrete solution to ˜ "N as a 
skeleton: 




0 , θ ≤ θ < ˜ θ1 
˜ qn −1 , ˜ θn −1 ≤ θ < ˜ θn , n = 2 , . . . , N 
˜ qN , ˜ θN ≤ θ < θ




0 , θ ≤ θ < ˜ θ1 
˜ #n −1 + v ( ̃  qn −1 , θ ) − v ( ̃  qn −1 , ˜ θn −1 ) , ˜ θn −1 ≤ θ < ˜ θn , 
n = 2 , . . . , N 
˜ #N + v ( ̃  qN , θ ) − v ( ̃  qN , ˜ θN ) , ˜ θN ≤ θ < θ . 
Proposition 3.1. The solution ( ̂  q(θ ) , ˆ #(θ )) is feasible for ". 
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Proof. The solution ( ̃  qn , ˜ #n ) n =1 , ... ,N is feasible for ˜ "N , and 
ˆ q(θ ) , ˆ #(θ ) takes the same values on the discrete skeleton θ = 
˜ θn as the optimal values of ( ̃  qn , ˜ #n ) in the solution to ˜ "N . By 
inspection, we see that ˆ q(θ ) is nonnegative and monotonically 
increasing. 
It remains to show that ˆ #(θ ) is increasing and meets the IC θθ ′ 
constraint for all θ ′ < θ . Recall the assumption that v (q, θ ) is in- 
creasing in θ and q . Thus, ˆ #(θ ) is increasing on the points of 
the discrete skeleton. ˆ #(θ ) is also increasing within each interval 
[ ̃  θn −1 , ˜ θn ] , and does not exceed ˜ #n = ˆ #( ̃  θn ) because of the IC n,n −1 
constraint. Thus, ˆ #(θ ) is increasing. 
To show global incentive compatibility, we need to show 
local incentive compatibility. We show that for any θa , θb ∈ 
[ ̃  θn −1 , ˜ θn ] with θ a < θb , the IC θa θb constraint is met. Write the 
following: 
ˆ #(θa ) = ˜ #n −1 + v ( ̃  qn −1 , θa ) − v ( ̃  qn −1 , ˜ θn −1 ) 
ˆ #(θb ) = ˜ #n −1 + v ( ̃  qn −1 , θb ) − v ( ̃  qn −1 , ˜ θn −1 ) . 
To prove incentive compatibility, we need to show 
ˆ #(θb ) ≥ ˆ #(θa ) + v (q (θa ) , θb ) − v (q (θa ) , θa ) . 
Substituting for ˆ #(θa ) and ˆ #(θb ) yields: 
˜ #n −1 + v ( ̃  qn −1 , θb ) − v ( ̃  qn −1 , ˜ θn −1 ) ≥ ˜ #n −1 + v ( ̃  qn −1 , θa ) − v ( ̃  qn −1 , ˜ θn −1 ) + v (q (θa ) , θb ) − v (q (θa ) , θa ) 
v ( ̃  qn −1 , θb ) ≥ v ( ̃  qn −1 , θa ) + v (q (θa ) , θb ) − v (q (θa ) , θa ) 
v ( ̃  qn −1 , θb ) ≥ v ( ̃  qn −1 , θa ) + v ( ̃  qn −1 , θb ) − v ( ̃  qn −1 , θa ) 
All terms canceling yields the result. !
To summarize, the solution to any discrete sample average 
problem ˜ "N is ( ̃  qn , ˜ #n ) . This discrete solution can be used to con- 
struct a continuous feasible solution to " as ( ̂  q(θ ) , ˆ #(θ )) , thus 
yielding a lower bound to the continuous problem optimal objec- 
tive "∗. 
3.3. Upper bound in expectation for "∗M 
We use sample average approximation to find an upper bound 
in expectation for "∗M . First, we show how the solution to ˜ "N can 
be used to find a feasible solution to "M . Consider the following 
solution ( ̂  qm , ˆ #m ) to "M based on the solution to ˜ "N : 




0 , θ ≤ θm < ˜ θ1 
˜ qn −1 , ˜ θn −1 ≤ θm < ˜ θn , n = 2 , . . . , N 
˜ qN , ˜ θN ≤ θm < θ , (3.3) 




0 , θ ≤ θm < ˜ θ1 
˜ #n −1 + v ( ̃  qn −1 , θm ) − v ( ̃  qn −1 , ˜ θn −1 ) , ˜ θn −1 ≤ θm < ˜ θn , 
n = 2 , . . . , N 
˜ #N + v ( ̃  qN , θm ) − v ( ̃  qN , ˜ θN ) , ˜ θN ≤ θm < θ . 
(3.4) 
The solution ˆ qm , ˆ #m is feasible for "M following similar reason- 
ing to that of Proposition 3.1 . Let m ( ̃  θn ) be the index m of the or- 
dered sample (θ1 , . . . , θM ) that corresponds to the sample ˜ θn , so 
θ
m ( ̃ θn ) = ˜ θn . SAA often refers to optimization using a function that 
is the sample average approximation of an expectation. The sample 
average approximation to "M using samples ˜ θn can be written as 
formulation ˜ "M with optimal value ˜ "∗M : 




v (q m ( ̃ θn ) , ˜ θn ) − #m ( ̃ θn ) − s (q m ( ̃ θn ) ) ] (3.5) 
subject to #1 = 0 (IR 1 ) 
#m ≥ #m −1 + v (q m −1 , θm ) − v (q m −1 , θm −1 ) 
∀ m = 2 , ..., M (IC m,m −1 ) 
q m ≥ q m −1 ∀ m = 2 , ..., M (MON m,m −1 ) . 
The goal is to show that as the bootstrap samples N increases, 
the objective function solution to ˜ "N , ˜ "∗N , approaches the objec- 
tive for "∗M . Formulation ˜ "M will be used to demonstrate how the 
solution to ˜ "N can be represented as a solution to "M in the next 
proposition. Thus, the solution to the solvable problem ˜ "N can be 
used to approximate "M using ˜ "M to place all instances of ˜ "N on 
the same feasible space as "M . 
Proposition 3.2. The solution ( ̂  qm , ˆ #m ) based on the solution to ˜ "N 
is optimal for ˜ "M . 
Proof. Formulation ˜ "M has the same constraint set as "M , but the 
objective function only depends on the sampled ˜ θn values and the 
corresponding decision variables. Formulation ˜ "M using ( ̂  qm , ˆ #m ) 
and ˜ "N using ( ̃  qn , ˜ #n ) have the same objective function value, but 
the feasible region of ˜ "M is a subset of the feasible region of ˜ "N 
because the IC and MON constraints must hold for all M original 
samples rather than just the N bootstrap samples. Because the op- 
timal solution to ˜ "N can be used to construct a feasible solution 
( ̂  qm , ˆ #m ) to ˜ "M with the same objective function value, ( ̂  qm , ˆ #m ) 
is optimal for ˜ "M . !
Proposition 3.2 shows how we can use the solution to ˜ "N to 
find the solution to ˜ "M . This is important because we can use 
properties of SAA to show that ˜ "∗M converges to "∗M as N increases. 
The next results formalizes this and presents the key idea needed 
to establish a bound for "∗M using ˜ "N . 
Theorem 3.3. "∗M ≤ E[ ̃  "∗N ] and ˜ "∗N → "∗M as N → ∞ . 
Proof. The result follows from standard SAA analysis (see 5.1 of 
Shapiro, Dentcheva, and Ruszczy ́nski (2009) for an overview). First, 
the discrete problem ˜ "M is a SAA for "M using the same deci- 
sion variables and constraints, and the objective function of ˜ "M 
uniformly converges to that of "M , so ˜ "∗M → "∗M as N → ∞ . By 
Proposition 3.2 , solving ˜ "N yields the optimal value of ˜ "M , ˜ "∗M . 
So as N → ∞ , ˜ "∗N = ˜ "∗M → "∗M . 
Next, we establish E[ ̃  "∗N ] as an upper bound for "∗M . Let 
p(q, #, θ ) = v (q, θ ) − # − s (q ) be the profit function in the objec- 
tive summation. Let the feasible space of ˜ "M and "M be $M . To 
simplify notation in what follows, we omit the full expression of 
indices in the decision variables so rather than (q m , #m ) m =1 , ... ,M ∈ 
$M we simply use q m , #m ∈ $M . Define 
"∗M = max 
q m , #m ∈ $M 1 M 
M ∑ 
m =1 p(q m , #m , θm ) 
= max 





n =1 p(q m ( ̃ θn ) , #m ( ̃ θn ) , ˜ θn ) 
] 
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because ˜ θn is sampled directly from θm . Note that for any candi- 
date solution ( ̄q m , #̄m ) ∈ $M , we have 
1 
N N ∑ 
n =1 p( ̄q m ( ̃ θn ) , #̄m ( ̃ θn ) , ˜ θn ) ≤ max q m , #m ∈ $M 1 N 
N ∑ 
n =1 p(q m ( ̃ θn ) , #m ( ̃ θn ) , ˜ θn ) = ˜ "∗M . 
(3.6) 
Taking expectations of (3.6) with respect to ˜ θn and choosing the 
candidate solution to maximize the left hand side yields 
max 





n =1 p( ̄q m ( ̃ θn ) , #̄m ( ̃ θn ) , ˜ θn ) 
] 
≤ E ̃ θn [ ̃  "∗M ] . (3.7) 
Note that the left hand side of (3.7) is "∗M after changing no- 
tation. Also, we have ˜ "∗M = ˜ "∗N from Proposition 3.2 . Substituting 
into (3.7) yields "∗M ≤ E[ ̃  "∗N ] which gives the result. !
3.4. Algorithm 
The reason for choosing a set of M fixed samples is to establish 
a fixed space for mapping problem ˜ "N to ˜ "M and "M . Operating 
over the same space is critical in establishing a fixed constraint re- 
gion as N increases and showing the convergence of a sequence of 
smaller SAA ˜ "N problems to "M . By solving the smaller problem 
˜ "N , we can generate a lower bound for ", and an upper bound in 
expectation for "M . 
The error of estimation using a sample average approximation 
with N samples is O(1 / √ N ) . As N increases, E[ ̃  "∗N ] → "∗M . Because 
the difference in "∗ and "∗M is O(1 / √ M ) and the error in the 
sample average estimator is O(1 / √ N ) , it is likely that the error in 
E[ ̃  "∗N ] overwhelms the error between "∗M and "∗ when N is rela- 
tively small compared to M . In summary, Theorem 3.3 guarantees 
convergence as N increases of ˜ "∗N to "∗M , and "∗M can be made 
arbitrarily close to "∗ by increasing M . As a bonus, the solution 
to ˜ "∗N yields a lower bound on "∗ which can bound the estimate. 
Conducting multiple replications yields information that could be 
used to construct a better estimate of the expected upper bound 
E[ ̃  "∗N ] , and potentially better lower bounds. We suggest the fol- 
lowing algorithm leveraging these results to estimate "∗: 
1. Sample M values of θ from f ( θ ), sort in increasing order as 
θm , m = 1 , . . . , M. 
2. Sample N values of θm with replacement ordered increas- 
ingly as ˜ θn , n = 1 , . . . N. 
3. Solve ˜ "N using the samples from Step 2. 
4. Generate the lower bound solution ( ̂  q(θ ) , ˆ #(θ )) from ˜ "N 
with objective value ". 
5. Repeat Steps 2-4 multiple times to estimate E[ ̃  "∗N ] and col- 
lect multiple lower bounds. 
6. Calculate the gap between the estimate of E[ ̃  "∗N ] and the 
largest lower bound solution ". Increase N and repeat Steps 
2–5 until the estimated optimality gap is small. 
We note that there is much literature on estimating optimality 
gaps using the sample average approximation method to choose 
sample sizes N and the number of replications needed to estimate 
E[ ̃  "∗N ] (see, for example, Bayraksan and Morton (2006) ; Bayraksan 
and Pierre-Louis (2012) ). 
4. Numerical results 
We demonstrate the performance of the algorithm with two ex- 
amples. The first uses a past implementation of the principal-agent 
problem where an analytical solution to the continuous demand 
problem has been derived. The second example is a different im- 
plementation where the true solution is not known. We construct 
the formulation using Pyomo ( Hart, Laird, Watson, & Woodruff, 
2012; Hart, Watson, & Woodruff, 2011 ) and employ the nonlinear 
solver IPOPT ( Wächter & Biegler, 2006 ) for generating solutions. 
The computing time for solving the optimization problems using 
a single processor was minimal, ranging from near instantaneous 
for small N , to less than 10 minutes to solve ˜ "N for N = 10 0,0 0 0, 
including the time to numerically integrate to calculate the lower 
bound. 
4.1. Example 1: A carbon capture example with known solution 
In recent years, operations research methods have been applied 
to numerous energy and sustainability systems, including carbon 
capture and storage systems and natural gas systems ( Kemp & 
Kasim, 2010; Klokk, Schreiner, Pages-Bernaus, & Tomasgard, 2010; 
Middleton, Kuby, Wei, Keating, & Pawar, 2012; Rodger & George, 
2017 ). In the first numerical example, we use an implementation 
based on past work solving principal-agent models for carbon cap- 
ture and storage from Singham and Cai (2017) . In this context, the 
agent is a power plant who emits CO 2 into the atmosphere and 
demands the service of the principal, who is a CO 2 storage op- 
erator. The principal offers a menu of options to the agent, with 
each option corresponding to a different demand value θ from a 
continuous distribution. The agent demands θ units of CO 2 stor- 
age based on his anticipated power usage. If the agent does not 
choose to store any carbon, he will pay a penalty p(x ) = α2 x 2 , x ≥ 0 
and p(x ) = 0 , x < 0 for emitting x units of CO 2 to the atmosphere. 
If the agent participates and purchases q units of storage, he has 
a linear cost γ q to capture CO 2 emissions before sending them to 
storage. We define the value function for the agent as 
v (q, θ ) = p(θ ) − p(θ − q ) − γ q, 
which is the penalty avoided by participating, minus the penalty 
actually paid on excess emissions over the amount stored, and mi- 
nus the capture cost. The principal has a linear cost s (q ) = βq as- 
sociated with delivering q units of CO 2 storage. Let the density of 
θ , f ( θ ), be uniform over [ θ , θ ] . The optimal contract offering for 
the principal was derived in Singham and Cai (2017) and employs 
a threshold policy. If agent demand is less than θ c , the principal of- 
fers the agent a shutdown/non-participation option, while for de- 
mand values larger than θ c the principal will offer a positive quan- 
tity and price to the agent. This threshold is derived as 
θc = max {θ , 1 
2 
(




and the optimal contract to offer the agent is 
q ∗(θ ) = { 0 if θ < θc 
2 θ − θ − γ + βα if θ ≥ θc , (4.1) 
#∗(θ ) = { 0 if θ < θc 
α(θ2 − θ2 c ) − (αθ + γ + β)(θ − θc ) if θ ≥ θc . 
(4.2) 
Thus when θ > θ c , the quantity offered the agent is linear 
with respect to θ and the information rent is quadratic with re- 
spect to θ . For θ < θ c , the principal chooses not to service the 
agent because the demand is too low. Relying on our past re- 
search on pricing carbon capture and storage systems ( Cai, Sing- 
ham, Craparo, & White, 2014; Singham, Cai, & White, 2015 ), the 
model parameters are set as follows. The range of values for θ
is [ θ , θ ] = [0 . 3 , 1] Megatonnes of CO 2 based on a sample of pub- 
licly available power plant emissions data. The capture cost for the 
agent is γ = $45/tonne, and the storage cost for the principal is 
β = $13/tonne. Assuming a carbon emissions tax of approximately 
$100/tonne when θ = 0 . 7 Megatonnes, the penalty function is cal- 
ibrated so that α = 2 . 86 × 10 −4 . 
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Table 1 
Uniform demand distribution results for the CO 2 example using M = 1 
million. For each sample size N we solve and collect 100 replications 
from different bootstrap samples. The best lower bound, the expected 
upper bound, and the standard error of the upper bound estimates are 
presented. 
N Lower bound Upper bound ( E[ ̃  "N ] ) Std Err of ˜ "N 
10 16.277 24.911 6.776 
100 16.997 18.750 1.976 
10 0 0 17.211 17.538 0.610 
10,0 0 0 17.237 17.291 0.161 
10 0,0 0 0 17.248 17.260 0.059 
∞ 17.250 —
While v (q, θ ) is not increasing everywhere, we note that it is 
increasing for q ≤ θ − γα where θ is in tonnes instead of Mega- 
tonnes to match the units of γ . The principal will not offer the 
agent a quantity higher than this value, as it is shown in Cai 
and Singham (2018) that the first-best solution when the principal 
knows the distribution of the agent is q ∗ = θ − γ + βα . Thus, v (q, θ ) 
is increasing and concave over the potential space of quantities q 
to be considered relative to the agent’s demand θ . The end result 
is that the optimal expected profit to the principal using (4.1) and 
(4.2) is $17.25 million. 
We can use this known optimal result to assess the quality of 
the algorithm proposed in Section 3.4 . Table 1 shows the results for 
this example. Let the total discrete sample size be M = 1,0 0 0,0 0 0. 
The problem ˜ "N is solved using 100 replications for each tested 
value of the bootstrap sample size N . The major improvement over 
the results in Singham and Cai (2017) is that the greatest lower 
bound from the 100 replications is now reported so the optimal 
profit is now clearly bounded on both sides. As N increases, we 
see the bounds converging around the true optimal solution. The 
intuition for the SAA solution being an upper bound is that the 
principal is assuming less variability in demand using the sampled 
discrete distribution rather than the real continuous distribution, 
and hence overestimates her expected profit. 
The bounds are relatively tight for N = 10 0,0 0 0. Recall that for 
small enough N the error in the bounds will outweigh the error in 
"∗M with respect to "∗. If N becomes large, the bounds will likely 
converge around "∗M which will differ from "∗ depending on the 
size of M . Given good bounds on the optimal expected profit, we 
next turn to the quality of the contract solutions delivered to esti- 
mate q and #. 
Fig. 1 plots the optimal contract values computed for a sin- 
gle replication of the experiment for each value of N . The code 
produces optimal values of ˜ qN and ˜ #N given a bootstrap sample 
˜ θn , n = 1 , . . . , N. We observe that as N increases, the contract val- 
ues appear to “converge” to the known optimal solution for the 
continuous formulation, though as mentioned in Section 1 estab- 
lishing functional convergence is difficult due to the discrete prob- 
lem operating on a different space from the continuous problem. 
However, the discrete solution can be interpolated to see the sim- 
ilarity in the solution structure to the continuous problem. 
The left plot of Fig. 1 displays the optimal quantity functions 
for the discrete problem for different values of N , and the solu- 
tion approaches the piecewise linear solution (red line). The right 
plot shows the optimal information rents, the solutions similarly 
approach the piecewise quadratic solution. In addition to the opti- 
mal expected profit bounds converging as N increases, this exam- 
ple demonstrates that the optimal contracts offered from the boot- 
strap may resemble the true optimal in structure. Thus, the solu- 
tion of a single problem ˜ "N can provide insight into the nature of 
the solution to the continuous problem. 
Table 2 
Alternative example using a triangular density function. The best lower 
bound, the expected upper bound, and the standard error of the upper 
bound estimates are presented using 100 replications for each value of 
N . 
N Lower bound Upper bound ( E[ ̃  "N ] ) Std Err of ˜ "N 
10 2.082 2.586 0.292 
100 2.105 2.187 0.081 
10 0 0 2.110 2.127 0.029 
10,0 0 0 2.111 2.115 0.007 
4.2. Example 2: Triangular distribution 
We can demonstrate algorithm performance for a more com- 
plicated formulation where analytical solutions may not be readily 
obtainable. The goal is to demonstrate that the solution can con- 
verge for more complicated functions. Consider the following arbi- 
trary value and cost functions 
v (q, θ ) = αθ (1 − e −q ) s (q ) = βq 2 − γ q. 
Furthermore, let the demand density of θ be f (θ ) = 
T ri ( θ , ˆ θ , θ ) , which is the triangular density function with min- 
imum θ , mode ˆ θ , and maximum θ . We assume the coeffi- 
cients α, β , and γ are nonnegative and arbitrarily set to be 
α = 10 , β = 5 , γ = 3 . For the triangular distribution, we use θ = 
0 . 3 , ˆ θ = 0 . 8 , θ = 1 . Table 2 displays the experimental results vary- 
ing the value of N . We again see as N increases the lower bound 
increases and the upper bound estimate decreases, with the vari- 
ation in the upper bound estimate decreasing. We note that the 
lower bound estimate is not guaranteed to be increasing as N in- 
creases, because it is just the best feasible solution out of the 100 
solutions generated for each N . 
Fig. 2 displays the solutions for the optimal quantity and infor- 
mation rent menus for random realizations of ˜ "N . While we do 
not know the exact structure of the optimal solution, we observe 
as N increases the solutions may approach a piecewise-smooth 
function of θ , implying that the underlying optimal contract has 
some structure. This example again lends hope that a single solu- 
tion of the bootstrap problem for large enough N and M may allow 
us to closely bound the optimal profit and deliver an optimal so- 
lution that can be interpolated to be similar in shape to the true 
optimum. 
5. Conclusion 
Most continuous principal-agent problems rely on analytical so- 
lutions in order to obtain structural results. We present a method 
for computing approximate solutions to the continuous principal- 
agent problem when analytical solutions are not available using a 
sample average approximation approach towards solving this prob- 
lem. The method relies on sampling values from the continuous 
demand distribution and using them to solve a discrete version of 
the problem. The discrete problem can be solved computationally, 
and the results can be used to find a lower bound and expected 
upper bound for the original continuous problem. We show that 
the expected upper bound converges in expectation, and quantify 
the error associated with the approximation. The numerical exam- 
ples illustrate how the bounds improve as the sample size used in 
the discrete problem increases, and how the optimal contract solu- 
tions computed may also converge to some structural form. Thus, 
we are able to obtain a solution that may have interesting struc- 
tural properties, while delivering an optimal value close to the true 
optimal solution. 
Solving the discrete problem is relatively easy numerically, and 
even a single solution to a smaller sample size discrete problem 
could yield manageable bound estimates on the optimal profit. In 
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Fig. 1. Optimal contract values ( ̃ qN , ̃  #N ) calculated for Example 1 (uniform distribution for θ ) using single replications of different values of N . The red line is the analytical 
solution to the continuous problem. (For interpretation of the references to color in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.) 
Fig. 2. Optimal contract values ( ̃ qN , ̃  #N ) calculated for the triangular distribution example. 
addition to bounding the objective function value, the solutions 
from the discrete problem can be used to provide intuition about 
the structure of the continuous solution. This means that the nu- 
merical solution could indicate a potential structural form of a so- 
lution which could be tested in the continuous problem, leading to 
an analytical solution. From an implementation perspective, even 
if the true analytical solution is not known, an approximate struc- 
tural solution may be easier to execute than a fully discretized so- 
lution over a large number of samples. 
We note that this method can also be used for solving the dis- 
crete agent-type problem when the number of agent types is too 
large to be solved computationally. The sampled values of θ can 
be chosen from a discrete distribution. In some cases, a distribu- 
tion for θ may not be available, but sampled values from data 
may exist. Then, these data samples could be used in the dis- 
crete formulation to obtain a solution. While the primary purpose 
of this paper is to solve continuous problems, the same numeri- 
cal techniques could be used to estimate solutions in cases where 
there are large data samples available. Additionally, this method 
has shown promise in numerical experiments for delivering con- 
verging solutions even when the value functions do not meet the 
assumptions in this paper. Thus, sample average approximation 
promises to be able expand the types of contracting problems that 
can be solved when formulations are not small or simple enough 
to be solved analytically. 
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